ABSTRACT Given the considerable increase in its powers over recent decades this paper asks how far the European Parliament (EP) is an attractive place to build a legislative career.
policy-seekers INTRODUCTION
Given its increasing involvement in the European Union's (EU) legislative process, how much has the European Parliament (EP) become an attractive place for those wishing to build a legislative career? In the last 25 years the EP has moved from merely being consulted on legislation to having codecision rights with Council of the European Union in a wide range of policy areas including internal market legislation, environmental policy, the free movement of workers around the EU, and agricultural and fisheries policies. Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) whose primary aim is influencing policy therefore have many more opportunities to do so than when the first direct elections took place in 1979. Nevertheless, building careers in the EP is complicated by the second-order nature of EP elections, which often leaves MEPs frustrated at the lack of discussion of their work during and between election campaigns. This means careers might be ended by factors beyond MEPs' direct control such as whether their party happens to be in government and the political issues on the agenda in their member state. responsibilities over that time. She argued this would provide a basis for the EP to be filled with careerists in future. Verzichelli and Edinger (2005) studied the EP's 2004 intake looking for the emergence of a supranational elite. They note that 2004 saw the highest return of previous members up to that point, excluding those from the 10 new member states. They point out that new arrivals are becoming younger on average and that practices of systematic turnover within national parties are declining. Nevertheless, as Scarrow (1997) found, these patterns differ by member state. Beauvallet and Michon (2010) had similar aims and, although they also found national variation, they argued that stints in the EP have become more stable and lengthier. They suggest a European Parliamentary elite is emerging and that securing leadership offices in the EP increasingly requires EU-specific experience.
Addressing a slightly different question, Meserve et al. (2009 ) use Schlesinger's (1966 concepts of progressive and static ambition to understand MEPs' defection from their party group line. Progressive ambition describes a desire to further one's career beyond the legislature in a more senior political office. Static ambition represents the aim of remaining in a legislature and working up its hierarchy. They show that defection from the party group line is more likely among younger MEPs, who have the possibility of moving into a national career (progressive ambition), and older MEPs who have less need to impress party group leaders with their loyalty. Much of this research begs the question, why would MEPs want to stay in the EP for long periods of time and build a career there rather than attempt to move into their national political system where they mind find a legislative career more attractive?
The next section develops a theoretical answer to this question.
THEORISING MEPS' CAREERS: WHY SHOULD MEPS WANT TO STAY IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT?
One way of understanding MEPs' careers is to think of them in relation to vote, policy and office-seeking behaviour (Hix et al. 1999; Strøm 1990) . A principal reason for wanting a career in the EP may be the policy influence that the EP affords. In her study of the EP's party system, Kreppel (2002: 23) theorises that policy goals are most likely to structure MEP behaviour, given the weak electoral connection in the EU. She argues that before the EP had much policy influence, MEPs' main policy goal would have been increasing the EP's legislative power. Once greater powers were granted, policy-seeking MEPs would attempt to influence the EU's legislative outputs using the new tools available to them. We hypothesize that policy-seeking legislators should be more likely to want to remain in the EP as its legislative power grows. This may be particularly the case for MEPs in the larger groups, which have a greater chance of affecting the outcomes of votes in the EP and which gain larger numbers of rapporteurships than smaller EP groups (Mamadouh and Raunio 2003) . A further implication of this theory is that policy-seeking MEPs should be more attracted to remaining on European Parliament committees the greater their degree of legislative activity. These committees are where the detailed legislative work of the EP is carried out (Neuhold 2001; Ringe 2010) .
Office-seeking legislators may also perceive more reason to remain in the EP over time. As the EP's legislative influence has increased so has the significance of 'mega-seats' (Carroll et al. 2006) . These are leading offices within a legislature. In the case of the EP, they include the presidency and vice-presidencies of the EP, chairs of committees, party group presidencies and the office of quaestor. The latter position includes responsibility for administration and financial matters for individual members. The EP President chairs sittings of the EP and the Conference of Presidents among other things. Vice-Presidents chair plenary sessions and take on other leadership responsibilities, and a subgroup of them are permanent members of the EP's conciliation committees, which meet when agreement cannot be reached at second reading in the ordinary legislative procedure. Holding such mega-seats may help members to make stronger claims about their records when seeking re-selection and re-election. We hypothesize that holding a mega-seat will increase chances of remaining in the EP from one election to another.
Nevertheless, there are costs to being an MEP. First, the amount of travel needed in order to attend business in Brussels and Strasbourg while maintaining a presence in the member state and/or district may amount to a great deal especially for those from the periphery of the EU.
We therefore expect that MEPs from peripheral member states are more likely to exit the EP at the end of a term than others. Second, the enlargements of the EU mean that in many of the EP's terms since direct election there has been a group of MEPs from new member states who may have started their EP careers with limited knowledge about how the institution functions. On the basis that some may find the job is not as they anticipated it, we hypothesize that exiting the EP is more likely at the end of the first term in which an MEP's member state was in the EU. As institutional knowledge builds among a member state's MEPs, this problem should become less prominent.
All of the above assumes MEPs make their own choices about whether they stay beyond their first term of office in Brussels and Strasbourg. Several factors undermine this assumption.
Studies of EP elections suggest that they largely conform to the second-order model in which, among other things, campaigns are dominated by national issues7 badly, except for when EP elections follow rapidly after national ones (e.g. Hix and Marsh 2007) . So the likelihood of re-election may vary on the basis of factors beyond MEPs' direct control such as whether their national party is in government. We hypothesize that if an MEP's national party is in government this makes exit from the EP more likely but that -on the basis of previous research (Hix and Marsh 2007 [ Table 2 about here] Previous evidence (Scarrow 1997) suggests there are considerable variations in tenure by country. Looking only at the first 15 member states of the EU, Table 2 What might explain these national variations? Some of the answer lies in how long these countries have been in the EU. Electoral systems may also make a difference in that the ballot structure is closed or ordered in some of the countries towards the top (UK, Netherlands, Germany and Spain). Other cases run against this, such as Ireland, which is in the upper part of the table but where the open ballot structure of the STV system is in place. Scarrow (1997) argues national variations are partly related to how an EP career fits with national political careers. She notes that in the UK and Germany there is a bigger divergence between the two career paths. In addition, there has been more of a tradition in some countries, such as France, to put high profile candidates at top of lists but then to substitute them with other politicians, part way into an EP term.
Tenure in the EP's committees
The data also allow us to look at stints not just in the EP as a whole but in its committee system where the detailed legislative work of the Parliament takes place (Neuhold 2001; Ringe 2010) . If MEPs are engaging in policy-seeking behaviour we would expect them to want to remain on EP committees that have policy influence. Table 3 shows how the proportion of stints lasting more than five years (one term) varies by committee. The ranking we see here makes sense in terms of MEPs pursuing policy goals. For instance, the Environment committee is the most legislatively active of all the EP's committees. Budgets has also been one of most powerful EP committees over time, particularly, in relative terms, during time when EP had no or very little legislative power (Corbett et al. 2003) . Foreign Affairs has often been a highly sought after committee, frequently chosen by the largest groups early in the process of allocating chairs (Corbett et al. 2007 ). It lacks legislative power but is nevertheless viewed as highly prestigious. Agriculture and Fisheries are two of the committees with the most obvious link to constituency interests (defined broadly here such that may refer to an entire whole member state). The committees at bottom of list, by contrast, are mainly those that lack much involvement in the ordinary legislative procedure.
[ Table 3 about here]
In addition to this, turnover on committees has declined over time. If we include all MEPs, the proportion staying in the same committee position after an election has risen slightly from 18.7 per cent from the first into the second term to 20.4 per cent across the sixth and seventh terms. Given the comparatively high turnover in the EP these figures are understandably quite low. If we look only at those who stayed in the EP across terms the figures are higher and the difference over time bigger too, rising from 38.9 per cent of MEPs staying in the same committee positions in the changeover from terms 1-2 to 48.5 per cent in the transition from the sixth to seventh terms. This evidence suggests some MEPs pursue careers involving spells on the same committee for a reasonable period of time. The variations in this by committee also make sense in terms of MEPs pursuing policy goals.
MEPs' age and aspirations
We can understand more about how far the EP is an attractive place to build a career by We consider several factors related to policy-seeking behaviour. First, we look for the effects of being part of one of the larger party groups. show how, as party group size increases, cohesion (measured by behaviour in roll-call votes) rises. The explanation for this is that as party groups become bigger, their chances of influencing outcomes in EP votes increase, hence they have a greater incentive to vote together. Due to the distribution of positions on the basis of group size in the EP, career advancement may also be easier within the larger groups. Applying this logic to the decision to attempt to stay in the EP, we expect that MEPs from larger party groups are more likely to remain in the EP after an election, once other factors are taken into account. Dummy variables for the three largest party groups in the EP (the European People's Party (EPP), the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) and the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)) are included in the model. Individual MEPs may also be able to enhance their chances of achieving policy influence if they held a mega-seat in the EP during the previous term. Holding such an office should provide incentives for MEPs to want to remain in the EP rather than exit voluntarily on the basis that leaving might mean losing the opportunity to achieve the influence that these positions afford. Holding such offices might also be advertised in election campaigning as an indicator of an MEPs' seniority in the EP. For these reasons we expect a negative relationship between holding a leadership office and the likelihood of failure to return to the EP. This is tested with a dummy variable measuring whether an MEP held the office of President or Vice-President of the EP, committee chair, party group leader or quaestor.
MEPs may also be more likely to achieve policy influence with a position on the most highly valued committees in the EP. Ringe (2010) shows how committee members are central to the formation of national party and party group positions on legislation in the EP. This is likely to be particularly important for committees that are prized by the major party groups, normally those with amongst the most legislative involvement or with the greatest prestige. We can measure which committees are most valued by the two largest party groups (the EPP and S&D) by checking the first two committees chosen by these two groups when chairs are distributed at the start of each EP term. Committee chairs in the EP are distributed in proportion to party group size using the D'Hondt formula. Larger parties will have more choices early in the process. For instance, after the 2009 elections, the EPP, as the largest group, was entitled to the first, third, fifth, seventh, eleventh, thirteenth, fifteenth, eighteenth and twentieth choices of committee chairs (Corbett et al. 2011) . We therefore include a dummy variable for MEPs who served on one of the top two choices of committee for the EPP and S&D in the previous term.
2 These choices change by term and allow us to measure the effect of being on a committee that was deemed significant in a particular parliamentary term. Information about party group's order of committee choice was taken from Clark and Priestly (2012: 197) , Corbett et al. (1995) , Jacobs et al. (1990) and Earnshaw (2003, 2008) . We expect membership of one of these committees in the previous term to be associated with lower likelihood of MEPs leaving the EP.
MEPs might also have been more likely to want to stay in the EP after the codecision procedure was introduced, as this offers the EP co-legislative power with the Council of the EU in the areas to which it applies. A dummy variable for MEPs up for re-election in 1994 or later is included.
As noted earlier, there are costs to being an MEP which must be taken into account in any model of whether members return to the institution. To test the proposition that greater travel times will make MEPs less likely to seek re-election, a dummy variable is included for countries on the geographical periphery of the EU (Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Malta, Greece, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland). We expect members from these countries to be more likely not to return to the EP after elections. Bowler and Farrell (1993) , Corbett et al. (2000 Corbett et al. ( , 2011 , Farrell and Scully (2007) , Lodge (2010 ), Nugent (1995 , Westlake (1994a) and the Sussex European Institute European Parliament Election Briefings.
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The second-order elections model suggests that whether a party is in government will make a difference to its fortunes in European elections (Marsh 1998; Reif and Schmitt 1980) . On the basis that they perceive less to be at stake in European compared with national elections, voters may choose to vote against their favoured party in order to send a signal of dissatisfaction to its leadership. This, it is argued, is most likely to affect parties in government, hence the expectation that MEPs from governing parties are more likely to fail to return to the EP. To test this, a dummy variable is included measuring whether an MEP's party was in government at the time of the European election. There is evidence that the timing of EP compared with national elections mediates the effects of being in government.
Governments facing European elections early in their lifetime may still be in a honeymoon period. As time draws on they may become less popular. To test for the effect of timing, the government variable is interacted with a dummy measuring whether the national election occurred within a period of twelve months prior to the European election. Data on parties in government and the timing of elections were taken from Woldendorp et al. (2000) and from the Election World pages on Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:Electionworld/Electionworld).
On the basis of previous research (Matland and Studlar 2004) , we can expect electoral volatility to affect legislative careers. Higher levels of volatility should be associated with a greater chance of MEPs exiting the EP. We calculate volatility using the Pedersen index (Pedersen 1979 ) with data drawn from the Election World pages on Wikipedia noted above, special issues of Electoral Studies dealing with European elections, and, for the UK, from
House of Commons Research papers on European elections.
Finally, in order to account for duration dependency in the data (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 174), a variable is included for the number of terms an MEP has served at the point at which their electoral success is measured. We control for the effects of age with a variable measuring age at the time of the relevant election. Older MEPs are expected to have a greater likelihood of failure. Table 4 presents the output of the discrete-time logistic regression model. The results indicate that many of the factors related to policy-seeking behaviour have the expected effects on our dependent variable as does one of the costs associated with membership of the EP. First, membership of a key committee in the term before the election at which the dependent variable is measured, is associated with a lower likelihood of leaving the EP. Similarly, holding a leadership office in the EP also reduces the likelihood of exit. This may indicate that such senior MEPs are more likely to want to return on the basis of the influence or prestige of their position, and/or that they are able to benefit from their seniority in election campaigning. The effects of the party group dummies are as expected in that being part of one of the largest two groups in the EP is associated with lower likelihood of failing to return to the EP compared with membership of a group other than the three largest ones.
Results
Nevertheless, we cannot make the same inference about the ALDE group, which has often been considerably smaller than even the second-placed party in the EP over time. The sign of the variable measuring cases at elections in 1994 and later is as anticipated but the coefficient is not statistically significant. It may be that MEPs had a greater desire to stand for election on and after this point, on the basis of the EP's greater legislative involvement but without modelling the decision to stand, rather than whether or not MEPs were re-elected, we cannot test this.
One of the costs we identified earlier affects the likelihood of not returning to Brussels and Strasbourg. The coefficient for the variable measuring countries on the geographical periphery of the EU is positive and statistically significant indicating, in line with our expectations, that MEPs from countries the furthest from Brussels are less likely than others to return to the EP after an election. While the sign for cases where an MEP's member state joined the EU in the term prior to an election is positive, as we would expect, the coefficient does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance so we cannot be certain of the notion that that there is something of a shake-up after these countries' first terms in the EP.
[ Table 4 about here]
Electoral system effects are mixed. While the signs on three of the four ballot structure variables are as expected, only two of them reach conventional levels of statistical significance. Where the single member plurality system applies, MEPs are more likely to return to the EP compared with the those elected under closed party lists. While neither of these systems allow voters to rank candidates, stability appears to be higher under SMP. We should be careful in interpreting this result though as it acts as a dummy variable for cases of
Great Britain prior to 1999 as these are the only ones where this system applies. Interestingly, More broadly, the findings suggest that we are starting to see the development of a European
Parliamentary élite. This makes sense on the basis that the EP has become far more deeply involved in the details of the European Union's legislative process in the last 25 years or so and is therefore a more attractive place for policy-seeking legislators. It also provides some evidence, but which would require further research in other contexts, that granting legislative powers to a parliament does make it a more attractive place to build a legislative career.
Nevertheless, to understand this fully we need to look at how MEPs' careers fit with those in the national arena and in particular, we need to know far more about what MEPs do after they leave the EP. For some, the attractions of a national political career may outweigh those of the EP even with its increased legislative role. Understanding this can only be done with comprehensive data on MEPs' post-EP careers which would allow for a study of progressive, discrete and static ambition (Schlesinger 1966) in the case of the European Parliament. This must be the subject of future research.
Figure 1 Turnover at European Parliament elections
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